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INSTITUTIONAL VIRTUES AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:
BRACKETING DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT JUSTICE

Kenneth D. Ward*
While constitutional theorists once assumed that judges derive authority by interpreting the Constitution correctly, 1 many now believe that disagreements about justice preclude consensus about how judges should
interpret the Constitution? Consequently, theorists increasingly focus on
the best institutional arrangement for addressing the problem of disagreement itself rather than focusing on the justice of particular decisions that
judges might make.?
Their arguments generally reflect two different traditions of liberal political thought. Some theorists, rooted in the tradition of Locke and Kant,
seek to resolve social conflict based on principles that all citizens can affirm. 4 A second tradition, associated with Hobbes, claims that people
should subordinate their interest in contesting justice in the name of social
order or related values advanced by the institutions that settle divisive social conflicts.5 This Essay distinguishes claims that reflect these traditions
in order to identify how those from the second tradition-what I will call
claims of institutional virtue-can overcome two criticisms that are often
raised against liberal arguments and can point debates in constitutional
theory in interesting directions.
In contrast to claims from the first tradition-what I will call structural
claims-claims of institutional virtue do not depend on assumptions about
judges' interpreting the Constitution in a manner that advances justice.
Therefore, they are immune to the criticism that liberal institutions advance contested ethical views and thus cannot be fair arbiters of people's
disagreements. Nonetheless, they are vulnerable to a second criticism: it is
* Associate Professor, Political Science, Texas State University.
1. Kenneth D. Ward, The Politics of Disagreement: Recent Works in Constitutional Theory, 47
REV. POL. 425 (2003).
2. See also MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); see generally JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
3. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); NEAL DEVINS & Louis
FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004); LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTrITUTION: A NEw DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEw (2001); WALDRON, supra
note 2; Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).
4. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 17 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW]; H.N. HIRSCH, A THEORY OF LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTION AND MINORITIES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(1992);

ROGERS M. SMrrH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN

(1990).

5. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); WALDRON, supra note 2;
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATT-ER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1996); Alexander & Schauer, supra note 3.
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not clear why people would prefer an institutional arrangement that promotes social order over one that they believe will advance justice, namely
whether people's interest in resolving conflicts provides sufficient reason to
abide by political settlements of their disagreements.6
This second criticism frames the problem of justifying judicial authority in terms of people's obligation to defer to judicial interpretations of
constitutional law. It suggests that one assesses any justification in relation
to how judges might decide the salient issues of the day-issues such as
abortion, affirmative action, or gay rights. Although considerations of justice would take on great importance if judges actually resolved such divisive issues, they often fail to do so. And claims of institutional virtue
cannot be weighed against justice if ongoing contests about what the Constitution means prevent people from knowing whether an institutional arrangement characterized by greater judicial authority will advance justice
more than one in which such authority is circumscribed.
This is not to say that the depth of disagreement provides reason to be
uncertain about the meaning of justice. It is to say, instead, that contested
disagreements about justice prevent people from knowing whether institutional decisions follow from attributes of the institutions that resolve questions of justice, such as the nature of the judicial process, or from shorterterm political variables, such as the relative strength of the religious right
and women's movement or the current membership of the U.S. Supreme
Court.
What is more, the second criticism reflects a tendency among constitutional theorists to treat disagreement like a disease in need of a cure. Political experience, however, suggests that a better simile would compare
disagreement to a chronic condition in need of management. We will see
that claims of institutional virtue are well suited to address problems associated with ongoing contests about what the Constitution means and point
debates about judicial authority in what many might consider unexpected
directions.
Section I of the Essay distinguishes claims of institutional virtue from
structural claims. Section II illustrates how this distinction becomes significant with constitutional theory's recent focus on the institutional arrangements that resolve disagreements.
Section III considers the significance that claims of institutional virtue
have for discussions of judicial authority. First, it disassociates claims of
institutional virtue from structural claims in which contested claims about
justice are obscured, because theorists either make ambiguous claims about
institutions or combine claims of institutional virtue and structural claims.
6. See MARK A. GRABER, DRED Scorr AND THEt PROBLEM OF GONS1TTUTIONAL EviL 17-18
(2007) (suggesting that we have reason to favor stability over justice). See also ROBERT COVER, JfUSTICE ACCUSED (1975) (addressing the psychology of judges who thought they were sacrificing justice
for stability or some other goal of law).
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Second, it considers how claims of institutional virtue might come into conflict with justice, and contends that these conflicts assume that judges resolve with finality disagreements about the Constitution, a condition that
does not seem to characterize American constitutional politics. Third, it
contends that claims of institutional virtue gain significance in conditions in
which contests about what the Constitution means survive institutional attempts at settlement and illuminates problems that follow when a society
must manage such contests. It also considers why the judicial process
might be less likely to address these problems if judges use their authority
to advance justice. This possibility suggests institutional reforms to reduce
the Judiciary's role in the process that defines constitutional values, even
though some theorists have used claims of institutional virtue to defend
broad conceptions of judicial authority.

I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLAIMS

OF INSTITUTIONAL VIRTUE
AND STRUCTURAL CLAIMS

Claims of institutional virtue bracket the disagreements about justice
that tend to animate discussions of judicial authority, while structural
claims implicate these disagreements. Structural claims are more familiar,
because theorists have used them to answer questions of constitutional interpretation. Some have argued that judges enforce a good form of democratic constitutionalism by enforcing values reflected in the American
system of government.' And judges have interpreted the Constitution in
this way to defend, among other things, the right to privacy, 8 the legislative

veto, 9 and even judicial review itself.'o
Claims of institutional virtue, by contrast, identify consequences of different institutional arrangements that have nothing to do with whether
those institutions will make decisions that advance justice.1 Jeremy Waldron uses a claim of institutional virtue to argue against judicial review.1
He contends that by its nature the legislative process treats people with
equal respect in a way that is not true of judicial process, because the judicial process significantly limits both the number of people who have a say
about a political decision and the arguments that receive a hearing before
that decision is made.1 3 His claim goes to the nature of the process that
makes decisions, rather than the justice of those decisions.' 4
7. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1969);
STEPHEN BREYER, AcTIVE LIBERTY (2006); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
8. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-86 (1965) (describing the right to privacy as a
penumbral right under the Constitution).
9. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
10. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
11. See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 2; see also Jeremy Waidron, The Core of the Case Against
Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
12. WALDRON, supra note 2, at 3, 4, 7, 159-61.
13. WALDRON, supra note 2, at 3, 4, 7, 159-61.
14. WALDRON, supra note 2, at 3, 4, 7, 159-61.
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While Waldron uses a claim of institutional virtue to argue against judicial review, Mark Graber employs a claim of institutional virtue to defend it.'" He associates it with a form of constitutionalism that "prevents
the politics of justice from destabilizing political regimes by providing unambiguous protections for some crucial interests likely to be insufficiently
accommodated by ordinary politics and also by establishing institutions
that privilege the policy choices that satisfy most powerful political actors."1 6 Judicial review contributes to this form of constitutionalism, "because justices often reach centrist decisions on matters that badly divide
national legislatures."" Although Graber cites decisions about slavery,
abortion, and affirmative action to support this claim, the claim does not
depend on the justice of those decisions.' 8
Nonetheless, as Graber's focus on Dred Scott v. Sandford19 suggests,
claims of institutional virtue can have implications for how judges decide
cases, and this might lead people to confuse claims of institutional virtue
and structural claims. Graber defends the decision as a reasonable interpretation of the legal sources that the Court applied in the case.2 0 But
Graber does not argue that the Taney Court should have decided Dred
Scott the way that it did. 21 He, instead, attributes the decision to a constitutional design in which slavery was given special protections and in which
questions about those protections were likely to be resolved through a judicial process that tends toward centrist decisions. 2 2 His central normative
claim concerns the virtue of this design: there is reason to favor institutional arrangements that promote stability rather than justice, even when
those institutions resolve issues as important as the question of slavery.2 3
The confusion is heightened, because judges can use claims of institutional virtue to explain their approach to questions of constitutional interpretation without addressing the justice of particular decisions. Justice
Scalia, for example, defends an originalist theory of interpretation that he
associates with the rule of law. 24 He contends that the Constitution cannot
be an effective legal limit on ordinary politics if judges adapt it to fit changing times or an evolving popular morality. 2 5
People might respond that Scalia favors originalist interpretation, because it allows him to advance a contested conception of justice, 26 or that
15. GRABER, supra note 6, at 249.
16. GRABER, supra note 6, at 249.
17. GRABER, supra note 6, at 249.
18. GRABER, supra note 6, at 249. This is not to say that people would believe that the stability
of centrist decisions would give them reason to defer to judicial decisions that they consider unjust.
19. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
20. GRABER, supra note 6, at 85.
21. GRABER, supra note 6, at 85.
22. GRABER, supra note 6, at 35-39, 249.
23. GRABER, Supra nOte 6, at 35-39, 249.
24. See SCALIA, Supra note 5, at 10-12, 17, 25, 43-44.
25. See ScALIA, supra note 5, at 40-41, 44-47.
26. CASs R. SUJNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBEs: WHY EXTREME RIGorr WING COURTS ARE WRONG
FOR AMERICA 133-42 (2005); see also Thomas B. Colby, A Consitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice
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originalist theories of interpretation do not constrain judicial discretion sufficiently for the Constitution to be an effective limit on politics.27 These
responses, however, do not challenge the point that Scalia's argument is a
claim of institutional virtue, a claim that does not depend on considerations
of justice.
The first response questions the sincerity of Scalia's originalism: it suggests that he appeals to the rule of law as a pretext to decide cases based on
his own view of justice. Even if it were true that (1) Scalia is an originalist
because he wants to advance a conception of justice that he associates with
the original understanding of the Constitution, and (2) many people disagree with the conception of justice that Scalia seeks to advance, it could
also be true that originalist judging would promote the rule of law, a system
of government in which people would know in advance the rules that
would govern them and in which those rules would be applied in a nonarbitrary manner. 28
The second response assumes that Scalia argues in good faith and
views originalism as a means to promote the rule of law. 2 9 But it questions
whether originalist judging is up to the task, suggesting that the discretion
enjoyed by originalist judges would make the law uncertain and increase
the likelihood of arbitrary application. One would expect Scalia to abandon originalism if this were true and originalism worked against the rule of
law. Otherwise, one must conclude that his claim of institutional virtue is
only a pretext used to advance a contested view of justice. But again, this
conclusion does not change the fact that Scalia makes a claim of institutional virtue; it only challenges the sincerity of the claim. 3 0
Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 10971139 (2009).
27. See David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn't Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J. L. & PuB.
POL'Y 969, 970 (2008).
28. See Scalia, supra note 5.
29. See Strauss, supra note 27, at 970.
30. This Essay addresses whether claims of institutional virtue, as a general form of argument,
have significance for constitutional theory, and not the narrower question of whether particular claims
of institutional virtue justify judicial authority. Therefore, I do not address whether Scalia's record as a
judge or the judiciary's record as a whole supports the possibility that judges could decide cases in a
manner that would advance Scalia's particular conception of the rule of law or any other conception of
institutional virtue. Indeed, I avoid questions of whether judges can decide cases in a manner that
manifests the virtues that theorists have associated with judicial review, because discussions of this kind
tend to obscure the significance claims of institutional virtue have. For example, Scalia's dissents in
cases such as Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 123 (2003); and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), are sensitive to a problem I
raise later in the Essay, namely judicial decisions as a source of political instability. He also suggests
that when judges insert themselves into political contests about issues as hotly contested as these, people will apply political pressure to the judiciary that will make judges less able to enforce constitutional
rights in contexts where they are clearly applicable. But by focusing on decisions such as these, the
salience of the underlying issues makes people focus on justice. They ask whether Scalia means what he
says: whether he is deciding these cases to advance the rule of law or whether he is using originalism as
a pretext to advance a competing view of justice. As a consequence, the question of whether one
should favor his conception of the rule of law is lost in the discussion, as is consideration of institutional
reforms that might address the problem of excessive judicial discretion that animates Scalia's criticism
of the majority opinions in these cases and also animates those who question the sincerity of Scalia's
originalism. Indeed, it seems likely that the judiciary would have sufficient authority to enforce clear
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It is easy to mistake claims of institutional virtue for structural claims
when they are part of an argument that, like Graber's' or Scalia's 3 2 , has
implications for how judges should decide cases. Similarly, it is easy to
mistake structural claims for claims of institutional virtue when structural
claims discuss the process that resolves disagreements about justice. These
claims tend to be pitched at a level of abstraction that leads people to miss
implications about how judges should interpret the Constitution, implications that follow from controversial assumptions about justice. These structural claims, then, advance contested ethical views in a manner that is not
true of claims of institutional virtue.
Ronald Dworkin's defense of judicial review, 33 for example, seems to
be a claim of institutional virtue. He contends that judicial review can be
justified as consistent with norms of democratic government if it increases
the likelihood that a political community would treat citizens with equal
concern and respect.3 4 It would do so by securing for citizens genuine
membership in the political community.3 5 This notion of genuine membership connects Dworkin's justification of judicial review to his view that
judges promote integrity, a virtue he associates with the rule of law. 36
Dworkin claims that by applying its principles with integrity, a community exhibits mutual concern, what he considers the hallmark of a community in which citizens have an obligation to obey political authority. 37
Judicial decisions, according to this view, should reflect the best interpretation of the political community's principles of justice, and judges should
extend these principles to all applicable contexts.3 8
Although Dworkin's argument does not depend on how judges will
decide particular cases, it is impossible to assess his claim without assessing
constitutional provisions and thus promote the rule of law values Scalia favors, even if the legislature
had authority to override judicial decisions as they apply to future cases. One would expect overrides
to be more likely in relation to hotly contested issues in which the Constitution is unclear or ambiguous,
but less likely when judicial decisions are unpopular but follow from clear constitutional provisions. In
those circumstances, the clarity of the law that judges enforce should strengthen the political forces
supporting the Constitution.
31. See GRABER, supra note 6, at 20.
32. See Scalia, supra note 5.
33. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 17.
34. DwoRKIN, FREEDOM's LAW, supra note 4, at 17 (taking the "defining aim of democracy to be
S.. that collective decisions be made by political institutions whose, structure, composition, and practices treat all members of the community, as individuals, with equal concern and respect").
35. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 4, at 23, 25-26 (stating his belief that the political
community must satisfy three conditions to secure genuine membership: (1) each citizen must have an
opportunity to influence collective decisions; (2) the interests of each citizen must be considered equally
in assessing the consequences of any collective decision; and (3) the political community respects the
moral independence of citizens-its authority to resolve moral disputes among citizens does not entail
the authority to force citizens to embrace particular moral views).
36.

See DWORKIN, FREEDOM's LAW, supra note 4, at 17; RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 176-

224 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE1.
37. See DwoRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 36, at 191-92, 98-202, 211, 213-14 (resting his argument on the assumption that political legitimacy depends on citizens having a general obligation "to

obey political decisions that purport to impose duties on them" and concluding that "a state that accepts integrity as a political ideal has a better case for legitimacy than one that does not").
38. DwomRN, LAW'S EMPIRE, Supra Inote 36, at 191-92, 98-202, 211, 213-14.
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the justice of judicial decisions. Dworkin makes this clear when he states
that "[t]he best institutional structure is the one best calculated to produce
the best answers to the essentially moral question of what the democratic
conditions actually are, and to secure stable compliance with those conditions." 3 9 And people would reject his argument if they found that judicial
decisions did not increase the likelihood that citizens would be treated with
equal concern and respect.
Claims of institutional virtue, by contrast, assign no weight to the justice of judicial decisions. 40 Consider, again, Waldron's conclusion that the
legislative process advances the value of equality in a way that is not true of
adjudication. 4 ' His claim that adjudication systematically excludes people
and interests from the process of decision making would survive, even if
one were to think that judges would always decide cases correctly. 4 2 And
Graber's claim that judicial decisions tend to be more centrist than legislative decisions does not depend on whether judges favor abortion rights,
affirmative action, or even slavery. 43

II. DEBATES IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:
FROM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION TO
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
Dworkin belongs to a generation of American legal scholars who came
to maturity during the ascendance of the Warren Court.4 4 Many of these
scholars sought to reconcile the Court's activism on behalf of individual
rights with the preceding generation's commitment to legislation as the primary vehicle for social progress, and as a consequence, their work tends to
focus on questions of constitutional interpretation.4 5 Indeed, Dworkin
frames his defense of expansive judicial authority as a response to his mentor Learned Hand, a giant of the earlier generation whose Holmes Lecture
criticizing Brown v. Board of Education4 6 is an important statement of that
generation's skepticism about such activism. 47 Dworkin clerked for Hand
and helped prepare that lecture. 48 He responded to Hand forty years later.
But it seems that the earlier foray into the controversy surrounding Brown
39. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 17, 34 (linking his understandings of democratic conditions and integrity; "democratic conditions" in the quoted language referring to an earlier
statement that "democracy means government subject to conditions-we might call these 'democratic'
conditions-of equal status for all citizens").
40. See WALDRON, supra note 2.
41. See WALDRON, supra note 2.
42. See WALDRON, supra note 2.
43. See GRABER, supra note 6, at 18-19.

44. Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 159-61 (2002).
45. Friedman, supra note 4, at 159-61.
46. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. See Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights (1960); ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITIcs 46-47 (2d ed. 1986).
48. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 347.
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would help explain the focus on judicial interpretation that permeates so
much of his work.
Constitutional theorists of Dworkin's generation share this focus. To a
significant extent, debates in constitutional theory have been animated by
the need to defend Brown.49 Alexander Bickel, for example, framed The
Least Dangerous Branch as a response to Hand and Herbert Wechsler,50
who also used the occasion of a Holmes Lecture to question Brown.5
Bickel introduces the term "counter-majoritarian difficulty" to describe the
problem of justifying judicial review, why a non-elected judiciary should
have authority to invalidate actions of elected institutions of government. 5 2
The countermajoritarian difficulty became the touchstone for two generations of constitutional theorists, and they tended to view the problem as
one of establishing the democratic legitimacy of Brown and other controversial Supreme Court decisions.9 3
A.

JudicialInterpretation and the CountermajoritarianDifficulty

The countermajoritarian difficulty assumes that judicial authority depends on judges' interpreting the Constitution correctly. More particularly,
theorists believe that judicial review undercuts two bases of democratic legitimacy. Elected institutions (1) define values that better reflect the will
of citizens, and (2) allow citizens more control over their government.
Constitutional theorists sought to ground judicial authority in legal principles that could overcome these concerns. Judges, according to this view,
derive authority when they interpret legal principles in a manner that advances values that the community endorses, or should endorse, and that at
the same time limit judicial discretion. It is thought that judges are constrained by the principles they interpret, and this constraint subjects them
to something like democratic control. 5 4
The quest to solve the countermajoritarian difficulty failed, however.
Disagreements about justice made it impossible for theorists to identify
principles that had broad normative appeal and that retained this appeal
when defined at a level of abstraction necessary to constrain judicial discretion. Principles that have broad appeal in the abstract lose that appeal
when applied to concrete legal issues. People, for example, do not agree
whether principles of equality justify or work counter to affirmative action
programs, or how to resolve conflicts among these principles, such as
49.
50.
51.
35 (1959).
52.
53.

LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER of LEGAL LIBERALISM 41, 59 (1998).
BICKEL, supra note 47, at 46-65.
Hebert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26-

See

BICKEL, supra note 47, at 16-18.

See Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Theory and the Faces of Power, in THE JUDICIARY
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFIcuLTY, AND
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTrIONAL THEORY 163-88 (Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R. Castillo eds., 2005);
Friedman, supra note 44,at 158.
54. See generally ELY, supra note 7. Although there are different understandings of the countermajoritarian difficulty, Ely's view has become the conventional view.
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whether principles of free speech extend to communications that
subordinate others.
Consider John Hart Ely's critique of non-originalist 55-what he calls
non-interpretivist-theories of judicial review. 5 6 He uses the play between
abstract principles and their concrete application to illustrate that these
theories do not identify an acceptable source of values that will limit judicial discretion." His book became a model for criticizing arguments that
claimed to solve the countermajoritarian difficulty, a model that is subsequently used against Ely's own argument, that judges should enforce certain core procedural principles that define American democracy.5 8
More significantly, Ely's work stoked two powerful trends in constitutional theory, both of which focus on limiting judicial discretion, and thus
assess judicial authority based on how judges interpret the Constitution.
First, theorists associated with the revival of civic republicanism extend
Ely's idea that judges should enforce principles that define the operation of
American democracy.5 9 They argue that judges can discover these principles within the wider social context in which citizens debate and define the
political community's values. 6 0 The second trend is the rise of originalism.
Originalists contend that judicial review is only legitimate if judges enforce
values they have derived from the ordinary meaning of the Constitution.>
B.

Claims of Institutional Virtue, Structural Claims,
and Process of Constitutional Politics

Both originalists and civic republicans, however, fail to identify principles that limit judicial discretion to the extent necessary to resolve the
countermajoritarian difficulty. As evidence of an unconstrained judiciary
has mounted, many theorists have sought to move beyond the countermajoritarian difficulty. Some theorists continue to assess judicial review based
55. I follow Paul Brest in using the term "non-originalist" in order to avoid the mistaken impression that non-interpretivists do not interpret the text of the Constitution and to achieve clarity given
that the primary critics of non-originalist judicial review call themselves originalists. See Paul Brest,
The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1979).
56. See ELY, supra note 7.
57. ELY, supra note 7, at 11-42.
58. ELY, supra note 7, at 101-04. Ely's critics note that Ely does not define his conception of
democracy at a level of abstraction necessary to limit judicial discretion, and that judges' concern for
doctrinal outcomes will inevitably determine the principles that they believe constitute American democracy. See generally STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTII UI-IONALISM: FROM THEORY TO
POLITIcS 160 (1996); PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 149-50 (1992); SMITH, supra note 4, at 173-74; TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 94107; Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE

L.J. 1063 (1980).
59. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013
(1984); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1525-27 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond
the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L. J. 1539 (1988).
60. Ackerman, supra note 59; Michelmnan, supra note 59, at 1525-27; Sunstein, supra note 59.
61. See BORK, supra note 5; see also Scalia, supra note 5.
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on the values they expect judicial decisions to advance. Consider the surprising convergence in the work of Mark Tushnet and Robert Bork-theorists who are on opposite sides of the political spectrum and who have been
associated with republicanism and originalism, respectively. 62 Both conclude that legal principles are too indeterminate to limit judicial discretion.
And each has argued that judicial review should be significantly curtailed,
because judges will not advance good values. 6 3
Other theorists take a different tact.' They give greater emphasis to
the process that expresses the community's values and less to the particular
values that legal decisions might advance.6 5 In other words, they attempt
to justify the discretion that judges exercise, rather than identify principles
that would constrain such discretion. They claim that political legitimacy
attaches to the broader political process that expresses values, and that
judges derive authority by contributing to a good process. 6 6 In so doing,
they have made both structural claims and claims of institutional virtue to
identify benefits of a constitutional structure that includes judicial review.
There has recently been a deluge of such arguments; theorists claim
that judicial review makes the political process more deliberative, representative, just, free or that it advances some other important goal.6 7 Republicans, for example, now emphasize the role judges play within the political
system, rather than the values that judges should advance.6 8 Bruce Ackerman and Cass Sunstein contend that judicial review is consistent with democratic government, when that idea is properly understood, and explain
how judges might contribute to deliberation about constitutional values. 69
Originalists have also veered from the view that judges legitimize their
power by enforcing legal principles that constrain their discretion. Instead,
they give greater emphasis to how originalist interpretation follows from
the institutional design of the Constitution. Scalia's association of originalist interpretation and the rule of law provides an example.7 0 Consider, as
62.

ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERI-

(1996); MARK V. TIUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999).
63. BORK, supra note 62, at 96-119; TUSHNET, supra note 62.
64. SOTIRIos A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984); CHRISTOPHER L. EIs-

CAN

DECLINE 96-119

GRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
CONSTITUTION

(2001);

(2001);

RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE

STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY

IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM

(1990); TERRI JENNINGS

PERETTI, IN DEFENSE

OF A POLITICAL

COURT (1999); SEIDMAN, supra note 3; and Gerald F. Gaus, Public Reason and the Rule of Law, in THE
RULE OF LAW: NoMos XXXVI (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).
65. BARBER, supra note 64; EISGRUBER, supra note 64; FALLON, supra note 64; MACEDO, supra
note 64; PERETTI, supra note 64; SEIDMAN, supra note 3; Gaus, supra note 64.
66. BARBER, supra note 64; EISGRUBER, supra note 64; FALLON, supra note 64; MACEDo, supra
note 64; PERETTI, supra note 64; SEIDMAN, supra note 3; Gaus, supra note 64.
67. BARBER, supra note 64; EISGRUBER, supra note 64; FALLON, supra note 64; MACEDO, supra
note 64; PERElTI, suprnote 64; SEIDMAN, Supra note 3; Gaus, supra note 64.
68. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONs (1991); see also CASs R. SUNSTEIN, ONE

CASE

AT A

TIME:

JUDICIAL

MINIMALISM

ON THE SUPREME

COURT (1999).

69. BARBER, supra note 64; EISGRUBER, supra note 64; FALLON, supra note 64; MACEDO, supra
note 64; PERETTI, Supra nOte 64; SEIDMAN, supra note 3; Gaus, supra note 64.
70. See Scalia, supra note 5.
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well, Keith Whittington's argument that judicial review contributes to a system of government that makes self-government possible. He contends that
judges undermine this system when they enforce constitutional principles
that do not reflect the Constitution's original meaning. These approaches
are emblematic of theorists who tether originalist interpretation to considerations of why the political community governs itself through a written
constitution. 72
These claims appeal to virtues that characterize governments with judicial review, as opposed to the particular values that judges are likely to
advance through their interpretations of constitutional principles. Steven
Macedo, for example, contends that the judiciary, as an institution, respects
citizens as reasonable beings, because judges must justify the exercise of
government authority in terms that litigants can grasp.7 4 His contention
depends on judges' exercising their authority in a certain manner-they
have to justify their decisions in certain terms-but it does not demand that
they decide cases in a particular way.7 s Judges, according to this view, can
in some circumstances decide cases for either party or for opposing reasons
so long as their decisions are properly justified. 7 6
While Macedo associates the rule of law with public justification, and
thus the virtue of reasonability, others have emphasized virtues such as
They contend that characterisconstancy, stability, finality, and fairness
tics of the judicial process explain why an institutional system that includes
judicial review will manifest the particular virtue they identify. Their arguments justify judicial authority based on considerations that do not depend
on the outcomes of particular cases. As with Macedo's appeal to reasonability, theorists can gauge whether judicial holdings are predictable,
whether constitutional doctrine is stable, or whether judicial holdings resolve controversies with finality-without any preconceived notion of the
correct way to interpret the Constitution. And although the structural emphasis of these theories lends itself to claims about the rule of law, one sees
similar arguments from people who view the Court from a more political
71. See Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original intent,
and Judicial Review 111 (1999).
72. See Michael J. Perry, We the People, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court
(Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (2001); Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism,in CONSTITUTIONALISM:
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS (Larry Alexander ed., 1998); Jed Rubenfeld, Legitimacy and Interpretation in CONSTIIUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS (Larry Alexander ed., 1998).
73.
74.
75.
an issue.

PERRY, supra note 72, at 99; Kay, supra note 72, at 16; Rubenfeld, supra note 72, at 194.
See MACEDO, supra note 64, at 159-62.
This is only true in cases where judges can provide adequate reasons to support both sides of
This assumption, however, appears to describe the controversial Supreme Court decisions that

tend to be the focus of debates among constitutional theorists.
76. See MACEDO, supra note 64.
77. See Kay, supra note 72. See also Alexander & Schauer, supra note 3; Lawrence B. Solum,
Virtue Jurisprudence:A Virtue-Centered Theory oflJudging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003) (describing
the virtues of judges by using virtue in its classical sense, such that the virtues described are associated
with what is generally called an Aristotelian conception of justice).
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perspective. Terri Peretti, for example, has claimed that a judiciary contributes to an institutional structure by expanding the range of interests it represents, 7 8 and Barry Friedman has claimed that a judiciary provides an
outlet for perspectives that contribute to public dialogue about constitutional values.7 Although there is a marked trend by which constitutional
theorists appeal to qualities that would lead us to favor some institutional
arrangements over others, it is not always clear whether they are making
structural claims, claims that depend on the justice of the decisions likely to
follow from a certain institutional structure; or claims of institutional virtue, claims that do not depend on such considerations.
Macedo's argument, for example, resembles Dworkin's: Macedo contends that the judiciary is well suited to perform the reason-giving function
and one must look at judicial decisions to gauge how well the judiciary
performs this function.8 0 But it is possible to determine that decisions are
reasoned-one does not have to say that they are well reasoned or better
reasoned then potential competitors-without considering whether they
are just. Although it is necessary to look across opinions to see whether
judges give reasons for their decisions, such analysis does not implicate
considerations of justice that would be necessary to determine whether judicial decisions have promoted Dworkin's conception of integrity.
Nonetheless, such assessments are not completely free from considerations of how judges decide cases. It is necessary, for example, to consider
whether judges give these reasons in good faith-whether they actually explain decisions as opposed to only being ex post justifications of values that
judges advance for other reasons. But these assessments do not require the
judgments about justice that were necessary to assess Dworkin's claim.
Consider, as well, Alexander's and Schauer's argument that a Court
empowered with judicial review is well suited to serve as a "single authoritative interpreter" of the Constitution, thus increasing the likelihood of stable constitutional doctrine.8" The Court, in Alexander's and Schauer's
view, performs a "settlement function," relating to disagreements as to
what the law requires; in performing this function, the Court promotes social coordination. 8 2 While it is true that one would assess this argument by
measuring the stability of judicial decisions, it is possible to compare the
stability of judicial decisions to decisions made through other institutional
arrangements without considering the justice of the decisions themselves.83

78. See PEREIm, supra note 64.
79. Barry Friedman, William Howard Taft Lecture: The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature
and Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 1257, 1291, 1297-98 (2004).
80. See MACEDO, supra note 64.
81. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 3.
82. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 3.
83. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JuDICIAL REVIEw 234 (2004); TUSHNET, supra note 62, at 27-28.
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CLAIMS OF INSTITUTIONAL VIRTUE AND
DEBATES IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

The last section noted a shift in constitutional theory towards arguments that include claims of institutional virtue. This section illustrates the
significance claims of institutional virtue have for debates about judicial
authority. First, it considers abstract claims about institutions that seem to
be claims of institutional virtue, until closer examination reveals assumptions about justice that make them structural claims. Second, it contends
that the problem of whether to sacrifice justice to advance values identified
by claims of institutional virtue is premature in the context of American
constitutional politics, a context in which ongoing contests about what the
Constitution means create uncertainty about whether any institutional arrangement will advance justice in the way that its proponents claim. Finally, it considers how claims of institutional virtue help clarify issues
related to judicial authority and the problem of managing these contests.
A.

Mistaking Structural Claims for Claims of Institutional Virtue

To grasp the significance of claims of institutional virtue, it helps to
consider them across two dimensions. First, some claims are litigant-centered, while others identify more general benefits that flow from judicial
authority. 4 Second, claims of institutional virtue vary in their distance
from the subject of adjudication: although arguments like Waldron's assign
no weight to the correctness of judicial decisions, there are also claims of
institutional virtue that make assumptions about non-doctrinal consequences of judicial decisions, such as Macedo's claim that judges advance
the virtue of reasonability." These assumptions sometimes make it difficult to know whether a theorist is making a claim of institutional virtue or a
structural claim.
Litigant-centered claims do not defend the expansive scope of judicial
authority that constitutional theorists seem to prize. Theorists, for example, have claimed that judges ensure that law applies to ordinary citizen
and government official alike, justify unequal treatment based on public
reasons, 8 6 or honor a person's right to "an individualized explanation" by
justifying the exercise of coercive power to those who feel its pinch." Because these arguments consider how the law is applied, they do not require
judges to have influence on constitutional doctrine beyond its application
to the limited set of circumstances that are litigated. Note that judges
would be able to advance the interests of litigants, even if elected officials
were to have authority to determine whether judicial holdings would have
precedential value.8 These claims, therefore, do not engage the question
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
they are

See infra text accompanying notes 86-93.
MACEDO, supra note 64; WALDRON, supra note 2.
Gaus, supra note 64, at 352; see also Scalia, supra note 5.
See Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to Judicial Review, 92 VA. L. REV. 991 (2006).
Judges, on the other hand, must have the final say about the outcome of particular cases if
to perform these roles. In addition, an acceptable override procedure would have to make
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at the center of recent debates: judicial authority to define constitutional
values that will be applied prospectively.
By contrast, arguments that identify general benefits that flow from
judicial authority have a broader scope. Theorists, for example, have contended that judges play a role in maintaining political or legal stability.
Some have found virtue in institutional arrangements that promote greater
public participation in the process that ultimately resolves disagreements
about what the Constitution means. 89 Others have claimed that judges perform a valuable settlement function and promote social coordination. 90
These arguments seem to engage the problem of judicial authority to define constitutional values prospectively. For example, it is likely that judges
must have the final say about what the Constitution means if judges are to
perform the settlement function that Alexander and Schauer envision.91
But it is a mistake to assume that an argument engages the problem of
judicial legislation simply because it associates judicial authority with social
goods that extend beyond the parties to litigation. Theorists, for example,
have claimed that judges represent the interests of unpopular minorities,
advance perspectives that tend to be underrepresented in the legislative
process, or ensure that the government considers diverse interests. 92 These
claims treat litigants as proxies for similarly situated people, and suggest
that the judiciary is well suited to advance the interests of those people. It
would seem, however, that judges should be able to perform these functions, even if they were without authority to define constitutional values
prospectively. 93
On the other hand, one would assign judges such authority if it were
assumed that these interests should prevail-that judges correct for deficiencies in the legislative process by insisting that political outcomes be
consistent with the interests those judges represent. This is a stronger
claim, one that entails a view of justice that associates adequate representation with specific doctrinal outcomes.
clear what principles would be applied to future cases, or should indicate when it is uncertain which
principles would be applied.
89. DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 3; MACEDO, supra note 64, at 159-61.
90. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 3, at 1371-77.
91. I should add that final say is defined in relation to Congress and the President. Article V
identifies the process that ultimately settles constitutional meaning. Moreover, I am not claiming that
their argument is sufficient to justify judicial authority to define law prospectively, only that it engages
the problem. Indeed, later I will argue that by focusing on institutional authority to resolve disagreements about what the Constitution means, Alexander and Schauer do not consider adequately whether
law would remain reasonably settled under an alternative institutional structure. See Alexander &
Schauer, supra note 3, at 1371-77.
92. BREYER, supra note 7; BURT, supra note 3; DEViNS & FISHER, supra note 3; PERETTI, supra
note 64; SEIDMAN, supra note 3; Friedman, supra note 44, at 159-61.
93. For example, judges would be able to perform these functions even if Congress could pass
legislation to overturn judicial precedents. Given that such legislation is often difficult to pass, the
interests that judges represent would be well represented indeed. See Kenneth D. ward, Legislative
Supremacy, wASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REv. (forthcoming 2011). And even if this were not the case
and it were easy to overturn judicial decisions, those interests would still gain an audience they might
not have received in the absence of judicial review.
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And this introduces the second dimension by which to consider claims
of institutional virtue. Claims of institutional virtue sometimes make assumptions about the consequences of judicial decisions, 9 4 and it is not always easy to distinguish these claims from structural claims. The problem
is exacerbated when theorists make arguments that are not sufficiently developed to know which type of claim they are, or make arguments that
combine both types of claims but fail to address the tension that arises
between the different claims.
Recall Dworkin's claim that judges promote integrity: a structural
claim that looks like a claim of institutional virtue.9 5 One cannot know that
judges advance integrity without knowing what it means to show someone
equal concern and respect. 96 Dworkin suggests otherwise when he contends that judicial decisions show someone equal concern and respect simply by enforcing the community's legal principles in all contexts in which
they apply.97 And while it is possible that Dworkin's argument is a litigantcentered claim of institutional virtue, it would be surprising if this were
true, given that litigant-centered claims do not engage the breadth of judicial authority that he seeks to defend.
More significantly, Dworkin is primarily concerned that people resolve
disagreements in accordance with the best conception of the community's
principles of justice." Judges, in Dworkin's view, show citizens equal concern and respect when their decisions extend and clarify the principles of
justice manifest in the political community's past practices. 99 This would
suggest that in some circumstances, such as when judges articulate a novel
understanding of governing principles, people will lose cases even though
they have conformed to what they had reason to believe were the legal
practices of the community. Dworkin discounts the burdens on litigants
when institutional arrangements leave the law unsettled.
He would respond that judges do not make the law less settled when
their decisions manifest integrity.100 Integrity characterizes the political
community's response to an already unsettled law.101 But this response
does not address the criticism: concern for those who must bear the burden
of an unsettled law might lead one to favor institutional arrangements that
make the law more settled over alternatives that manifest the virtue of integrity. What matters for Dworkin is how an unsettled law can come to
reflect a coherent vision of justice. This is not to say that he is wrong in
94. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
95. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 32-38.
96. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 32-38. Recall that Dworkin is explicit in assigning his substantive argument priority over structural considerations, even though his discussion of
integrity sometimes suggests otherwise.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
98. See supra text accompanying note 39.
99. See supra text accompanying note 38.
100. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 36, at 134, 142-43, 214-15, 373-89.
101. See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 36, at 134, 142-43, 214-15, 373-89.
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assigning priority to justice; it is to illustrate how distinguishing the different aspects of Dworkin's argument makes his normative claim clearer and
suggests potential objections he must overcome to sustain it.
The distinction between structural claims and claims of institutional
virtue becomes particularly important, given the recent spate of theories
that, like Dworkin, contend that judicial review promotes democratic government. But many constitutional theorists are less clear than Dworkin.' 02
Because their conceptions of democracy are abstract, it is hard to identify
the normative stakes of these arguments and to what extent they rest on
contested assumptions about justice.
In some instances, it is difficult to distinguish whether a theorist is
making a structural claim or a claim of institutional virtue. Friedman and
Peretti, for example, both contend that judicial review contributes to democratic government; Friedman claims that judicial review improves democratic deliberation by representing particular types of interests,10 3 while
Peretti claims it expands the range of interests a government represents. 104
To determine whether these are claims of institutional virtue, one would
have to know what it means for a government to represent interests
adequately.
Because all legislation will benefit some interests and work against
others, it is necessary to distinguish an interest that fails because legislators
did not give it requisite attention from an interest that fails after it received
such attention. 05 Ely, for example, identifies conditions that make it reasonable to infer that legislation reflects prejudice rather than serious consideration of people's interests.10 6 His argument depends on an unstated
view of justice in that it assumes that certain outcomes would not have
occurred if minorities had received adequate representation. Ely justifies
judicial authority to invalidate legislative outcomes that could not have resulted from a well-ordered political process.
Claims of institutional virtue, by contrast, indicate a weaker understanding of representation. Judicial review would have to increase the
number or diversity of interests represented, regardless of what those interests happened to be or whether they succeeded in influencing constitutional doctrine. To sustain these claims would require agreement as to
formal criteria that could be used to count the number of distinct interests
that participate in the process that makes the decision. For example, one
might count the number of distinct ideological positions found in a bill's
102. See infra text accompanying notes 103-06.
103. See Friedman, supra note 79, at 1291, 1297-98.
104. See PERETTI, supra note 64.
105. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GoRDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY
OF DEMOCRAcy (1957); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory
of Groups (1965); William H. Piker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (1962); Gordon Tullock, The
Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking (1989).
106. ELY, supra note 7,at 135-70.
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legislative history or in the arguments made in a related set of legal
briefs.10 7
A different problem arises when theorists combine structural claims
and claims of institutional virtue without addressing the tension between
the different claims. These arguments not only depend on contested assumptions of justice that underlie the structural claim; those assumptions
suggest that the values associated with the claim of institutional virtue
should be subordinated in the name of justice.
Devins and Fisher, for example, contend that the interaction between
judges and elected officials will lead to a constitutional law that better reflects people's views. 0 8 They defend judicial review, in part, because it
increases the likelihood that such views will be represented. 109 But Devins
and Fisher also reject judicial supremacy in favor of an institutional arrangement that promotes greater political stability, contending that people's participation in the process that defines constitutional values increases
the likelihood that they will accept the authority of the Court and even of
the Constitution itself. 110
In order to ensure that constitutional doctrine reflects people's views,
however, Devins and Fisher move beyond the claim that judges represent
these views and suggest these views enjoy a presumption of authority. 11
This presumption can lead to instability that would bring the structural
claim in conflict with its institutional counterpart.
To understand why, first consider a weaker version of the structural
claim that judges represent particular views. Rather than insist that constitutional doctrine reflect those views, one might favor institutional arrangements that provide sufficient avenues to have them considered. A court
with judicial review provides such an avenue; judges can overturn decisions
of elected officials that seem to ignore important viewpoints. But once a
court represents these interests, and thus brings them to the attention of
elected officials, the question remains of how to resolve the conflict between the judges' interpretation of the Constitution and the opposing interpretation of elected officials.
If it were thought that judges represent views that should be reflected
in constitutional doctrine, one would favor a system that makes it difficult
to overturn judicial interpretations of constitutional law, such as the current system in which judicial decisions can be overturned by an Article V
Amendment or through the informal political process by which judicial appointments change the ideological make-up of the Court. If, on the other
107. Although claims of institutional virtue lend themselves to empirical study, they are like structural claims in that they can be contested on normative grounds. One might establish that certain
institutional arrangements tend to represent a greater number or a variety of interests, but to endorse
Friedman's or Peretti's argument, one must conclude that representing a greater number or variety of
interests is a mark of a well ordered government.
108. DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 3, at 228-30, 234.
109. DEVINS & FISHER, Supra nOte 3, at 228-30, 234.
110. DEVINs & FISHER, Supra note 3, at 228-30, 234.
111. DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 3, at 228-30, 234.
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hand, those views need only be considered, then one might favor an institutional arrangement that makes it easier for elected officials to overturn judicial decisions.
Devins and Fisher seem to favor the stronger notion of representation.1 1 2 Consider their discussion of PlannedParenthoodof Pennsylvania v.
Casey in which they contend that Casey reaches the only viable compromise among competing views of abortion."' It is odd to think of Casey as a
compromise, given that the holding does not reflect the pro-life position
that abortions be significantly curtailed. To do so, one must accept the doctrinal conclusion that the pro-choice position should prevail over some
range of cases.
Devins and Fisher believe that any tolerable legal regime would ensure some access to abortion, and this conclusion suggests why they assign
judicial interpretations of constitutional law some priority over competing
decisions of elected officials, namely that constitutional doctrine is insufficiently representative if it fails to reflect certain views." 4 Note that judges
would have been able to represent the pro-choice position in a regime that
allowed elected officials to overturn their precedents, though it would have
been more difficult to sustain abortion rights in such a regime.
This priority is a potential source of instability, given that some opponents of the Court believe that its decisions enjoy too great a presumption
in an ongoing discussion of what the Constitution means. Although they
might agree with Devins and Fisher that our institutional arrangements create avenues that allow people to challenge judicial interpretations of constitutional law, 11 5 they would take exception with the claim that these
avenues are sufficient for people to believe themselves adequately represented in the process that defines constitutional values.116
This is not to say that Devins and Fisher are wrong to assign this priority to judicial decisions or even that this priority has in fact introduced instability into the political community. But they do not address this
possibility,1 7 and one reason they fail to do so is that it is difficult to identify the tension without disentangling the structural claim from the claim of
institutional virtue.
112.

DEVINS & FISHER,

113.

DEVINS

supra note 3, at 137-39, 235-37.
supra note 3, at 137-39, 235-37 (contrasting the conception of abortion
rights articulated in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),

&

FISHER,

with the original decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and stating that Casey reaffirmed abortion rights but allowed abortion to be regulated; contending that Casey is a better reflection of citizens'
attitudes about abortion and that the decision is the fruit of political challenges to Roe).
114.

DEVINS

115.

DEVINS

TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christopher
[hereinafter THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL]; RICHARD JOHN NEUH-AUS, THE END oF DETHE JUDICIAL USURPATION OF POLITICS - THE CELEBRATED FIRST THINGS DEBATE WITH
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Wolfe ed., 2004)
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& FISHER, supra note 3, at 137-39, 235-37.
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117. See generally DEVINS
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Conflicts Between Claims of Institutional Virtue and Justice

The question remains whether claims of institutional virtue identify
values of sufficient weight to lead people to favor an institutional arrangement that manifests such virtues over one that they believe more likely to
advance justice. It is easy, however, to exaggerate the significance of these
conflicts in conditions in which institutions do not really resolve contests
about justice.
Consider, again, Waldron's claim of institutional virtue. He suggests
that people's interest in having a disagreement resolved respectfully in a
way that does not prejudge the disagreement outweighs any particular person's interest in having the disagreement resolved in accordance with his or
her own view of justice.1 " His argument comes into conflict with justice in
at least two ways. First, people might believe that judicial review is necessary to invalidate legislative decisions that promote particularly egregious
injustices. 11 9 Second, they might believe that an institutional arrangement
that includes judicial review increases the likelihood that a political community will achieve justice.120
The first conflict does not force one to weigh justice against the virtue
of equal respect that in Waldron's view characterizes legislation. The fact
that people have reason to challenge unjust legislation does not speak to
Waldron's contention that the legislative process resolves disagreements
about justice without prejudging those disagreements. Waldron also recognizes that such injustice might be indicative of deeper problems that would
render his argument moot; there is little reason to be interested in how a
society might resolve disagreements about conceptions of justice that are
fundamentally flawed. 1 2 1
Waldron cannot escape the second conflict, however. He must explain
why the conception of political association he favors gives people a reason
to reject an institutional arrangement they believe will advance justice over
a legislative process that does not prejudge people's disagreements about
justice. The same conflict arises for theorists who use claims of institutional
virtue to defend greater judicial authority. Why, for example, should people favor institutional arrangements manifesting the virtues that Macedo,
Graber, as well as Alexander and Schauer associate with judicial review,
reasonability, settlement, and stability, respectively,122 over arrangements
they believe more likely to advance justice?
118. wALDRON, supra note 2, at 101-03, 204-08.
119. See, e g., DEVINs & FISHER, supra note 3, at 234; MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION,
THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 135-36 (1982); DAVID AJ. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITU
row 291-92 (1986); ROBERT A. SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 16 (1971);

Thomas I. Emerson, The Power of Congress to Change Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court:
The Human Life Bill, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 129, 142 (1982).
120. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 17.
121. See Waidron, supra note 2, at 280-81.
122. See generally GRABER, supra nOte 6; MACEDO, supra note 64; Alexander & Schauer, supra
note 3.
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It is important that these claims find virtue in institutional arrangements that resolve disagreements about justice. As a consequence, the virtues they associate with judicial review-or in the case of Waldron, virtues
associated with the legislative processl23-must be weighed against the
conception of justice that might be advanced by other arrangements. But
this focus on how to resolve disagreements obscures an important aspect of
American political practice: disagreements about hotly contested issues of
justice-issues such as abortion, gay rights, and affirmative action are often
settled without finality; disagreements about justice do not evaporate once
the Supreme Court purports to tell people what the Constitution means.
These extended disagreements make it uncertain whether claims of institutional virtue actually conflict with claims about justice. The uncertainty follows because constitutional theory's debate about the best
institutional arrangement is also part of a broader contest about what the
Constitution means. Consider, for example, the dual nature of Dworkin's
argument. 124 He combines abstract claims about institutional qualities that
would explain why the judicial process is more likely to promote integrity
than would the legislative process 125 with concrete examples of how judges
must interpret the Constitution for that process to work properly. Because
his examples contribute directly to the broader contest about the Constitution, they tend to overwhelm discussion of the abstract claim.
This is not surprising given that Dworkin, like many constitutional theorists, is interested in questions of constitutional interpretation, and is particularly interested in the problem of how the Constitution pertains to the
political questions of the day. 12 6 This would explain why Dworkin discusses issues of constitutional interpretation relating to abortion, free
speech, and affirmative action, among others, without engaging seriously
the question of whether the institutional arrangement he favors is the best
one for securing integrity.1 27
Consider, as well, recent discussion of judicial supremacy. 12 8 The discussion has focused on the relative authority of different institutions when
they assert competing interpretations of constitutional law; therefore, it,
too, has gravitated to divisive issues such as abortion, integration, and slavery. As a consequence, the question of judicial supremacy is conflated with
contests about what the Constitution means, and theorists seem more interested in defending correct constitutional interpretations than in identifying
123. WALDRON, supra note 2.
124. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 32-38.
125. DWORKIN, FREEDOM's LAW, supra note 4, at 30-31, 344-46 (discussing how judicial review
might promote deliberation about constitutional values-deliberation that, in comparison to legislative
decision making, is less likely to compromise important principles).
126. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM's LAW, supra note 4, among others; DWoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE,
supra note 36; RONALD DWORKIN, A MAT1-ER OF PRINCIPLE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHrs SERIOUSLY (1977). See also BICKEL, supra note 53, at 163-68; BORK, supra note 5; ELY, supra
note 6.
127. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4.
128. See generally DEVINs & FISHER, supra note 3; NEUHAUS, supra note 116; THAT EMINENT
TRIBUNAL, supra note 116.

2011] INSTITUTIONAL VIRTUES AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

53

institutional qualities that would explain whether judges or elected officials
were more likely to reach the correct conclusion. 1 2 9
While it is a problem that constitutional theorists tend not to focus on
longer-term consequences of different institutional arrangements, uncertainty about whether institutional virtues would conflict with justice would
remain even if theorists actually focused on such consequences. Uncertainty follows from difficulty in determining whether to attribute just decisions to the nature of the institutional process that makes a decision or the
political forces that act on that process.130 It is made worse when one considers that constitutional theory's debate about judicial authority compares
institutional arrangements that do not vary by very much; a legislative process checked by broad judicial authority is compared to one in which such
authority is circumscribed.
Devins and Fisher, for example, suggest that the current arrangement
advances justice, because judges represent views that would otherwise go
unrepresented. 3 1 Even if they are right that views such as the pro-choice
position must be vindicated in order to be represented adequately, 3 2 it is
not clear that it was the judicial process that ensured their vindication in
Casey. To establish that, they would have to control for the political forces
that (1) determined the make-up of the Court and legislature, (2) led the
case to be brought and heard at that time, (3) influenced the justices who
made the decision, and (4) influenced how other institutions responded to
the decision. Moreover, they would have to do so for a range of cases
decided over a long period of time.
C. Claims of Institutional Virtue and the Justification
of Judicial Authority
It would seem that claims of institutional virtue should take on added
significance when there is uncertainty about whether competing institutional arrangements will advance justice. What is more, claims of institutional virtue lend themselves to problems that follow in societies that must
manage disagreements about what the Constitution means.133 These
claims, however, suggest a less ambitious conception of judicial authority,
given that they are not associated with a general interest in living in a just
DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 3; NEUHAUS, supra note 116; THAT EMINENT
note 116.
130. Although related, this is not the claim that Gerald N. Rosenberg makes in The Hollow Hope:
Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (1991). While I am claiming that political forces make it
impossible to know whether the substance of judicial decisions should be attributable to the nature of
the judicial process or to political forces that act on that process, Rosenberg contends that judicial
holdings do not have the efficacy that proponents of broad judicial authority claim for them. He argues
that political forces provide a better explanation for social changes relating to equality for African
Americans and women than do landmark holdings.
131. DEVINs & FISHER, supra note 3, at 37-39, 235-37.
132. DEVINS & FISHER, Supra note 3, at 37-39, 235-37.
133. See BURT, supra note 3; COVER, Supra note 6; GRABER, supra note 6, at 17-18; SEIDMAN,
supra note 3.

129. See generally
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society. This is obscured, because claims of institutional virtue are considered in the context of a debate about authority to resolve highly charged
disagreements about the Constitution. By viewing constitutional politics as
an ongoing contest about justice, rather than a series of isolated disagreements that institutions resolve in turn, one can see that claims of institutional virtue have significant implications for constitutional theory's
discussion of judicial authority.
Consider, again, the question of judicial supremacy. For the most part,
theorists have focused on who sets the short-term status quo, rather than
consequences that follow because that status quo is contested. Some theorists describe the process that resolves questions of constitutional meaning
and identify whose view of the Constitution triumphs.1 34 Others argue
about whose views should triumph and appeal to considerations related to
who is most likely to decide cases correctly or promote other ends related
to settlement.' 3 Much of this discussion occurs within a paradigm defined
by the question of people's obligation to defer to judicial interpretations of
constitutional law, a paradigm that rests on the assumption that judges or
other institutional actors put to rest disagreements about what the Consti-

tution means. 13 6
This assumption underlies Devins's and Fisher's claim that judicial decisions should enjoy some presumption of authority, because judges ensure
that disagreements about what the Constitution means are settled through
a process that represents a broad range of views. But as was seen earlier,
Devins's and Fisher's focus on stable settlement obscures the possibility
134. DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 3, at 112-16; KRAMER, supra note 83, at 234; J. MITCHELL
PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A
SEPARATED SYSTEM 3-5 (2004); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (2002); Walter F. Murphy, Who
Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401 (1986). Keith E.
Whittington takes a different but related approach. See KEITH E. WHITrINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 293-96 (2007) (rather than focusing on who resolves disagreements
about what the Constitution means or who should have authority to do so, describing the political
conditions that determine the likelihood of whether political actors will defer to judicial interpretations
of constitutional law). Whittington also finds virtue in the American system of politics, contending that
the weakness of the judiciary during certain periods creates an opportunity for political actors to redefine fundamental values while reaffirming a commitment to the Constitution, and during other periods,
judges' interactions with political actors allow authority to shift among different institutions, such that
the government as a whole can pursue policies that might be unattainable in governments in which
responsibility for constitutional interpretation rested solely with an easily identifiable institution.
WHITTINGTON, supra, at 293-96. Because Whittington's purpose is for the most part descriptive, however, he never develops his argument or compares the virtues of this arrangement to one with greater
accountability.
135. BORK, supra note 62, at 96-119; NEUHAUS, supra note 116; TUSHNET, supra note 2; Alexander & Schauer, supra note 3.
136. There are theorists who assess judicial authority in relation to an ongoing contest about what
the Constitution means and find virtue in qualities of the judiciary that allow judges to advance people's
deliberation about constitutional values. These arguments, however, focus on how judges should decide particular cases, rather than the question of what is the best institutional arrangement for managing ongoing contests about what the Constitution means. Moreover, these arguments seem to be
structural claims in that they suggest a model of deliberation that depends on contested assumptions
about justice. See BURT, Supra note 3; SEIDMAN, supra note 3; SUNs-TEIN, supra note 68.
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that a presumption in favor of judicial decisions introduces instability of a

different kind.137
It is odd that Devins and Fisher use Casey as an example of an institutional arrangement's promoting stability. Although they recognize that
Roe unleashed forces that brought political upheaval and that abortion is a
permanent part of a political landscape, they do not see that the abortion
controversy has continued to be heated after Casey and, perhaps, became
inflamed with the plurality opinion's claim of judicial supremacy.
For many, Casey places the Constitution on the wrong side of a culture
war.1 ' Although one might dispute the origins and the significance of the
conflict, it is clear that citizens on both sides assume that the Judiciary is
the central battleground. This assumption has ramifications for political
discourse at all levels of government and for policy decisions that are far
removed from the conflict itself. These issues would be divisive, no doubt,
under any institutional arrangement, but it seems that the stakes of the
abortion debate are raised because of the presumption of authority that
characterizes judicial interpretations of constitutional law.
Instability of this kind suggests the need for institutional reforms that
that would weaken the authority of judicial holdings.13 9 But the debate
about judicial supremacy tends to venture away from such institutional reforms, because theorists focus on how institutions resolve contests about
what the Constitution means rather than the field on which these disagreements are contested.140
Moreover, this focus on putting disagreement to rest makes it easy to
overstate the significance that claims of institutional virtue have for discussions of judicial authority to define constitutional values. Many claims respond to problems that arise because disagreements about justice force
people to live with a law that is often in flux.14' They associate judicial
review with various virtues that speak to the problems of citizens who feel
the force of law.142 Judges, theorists have claimed, justify legal holdings,
make the law more predictable, ensure its general applicability, resolve

137. The same is true of Graber's suggestion that judges promote stability. While it might be true
that judicial settlements are likely to be more centrist than decisions of other institutions, these settlements also influence a wide range of political issues that intersect with the question of abortion and do
so in conditions in which abortion's opponents believe that the status quo enjoys an unfair presumption
of authority.
138. NEUHAUS, supra note 116.

139. See Ward, supra note 93.
140. See, e.g., BORK, Supra note 62, at 96-119; TUSHNET, supra note 62. Reforms of the kind
proposed by Tushnet and Bork seek to limit judicial authority for reasons related to how controversies
are resolved and not related to the stickiness of the status quo.
141. See, e.g., PAUL 0. CARRESE, THE CLOAKINO OF POWER: MONTESQUIEU, BLACKSTONE, AND
THE RISE OF JUDICIAL AcrivisMs 259-63 (2003); MACEDO, supra note 64; Alexander & Schauer, supra
note 3; Eylon & Harel, supra note 87; Gaus, supra note 64; Scalia, supra note 5.
142. See, e g., CARRESE, supra note 141, at 259-63; MACEDO, supra note 64; Alexander & Schauer,
supra note 3; Eylon & Harel, supra note 87; Gaus, supra note 64; Scalia, supra note 5.
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particular controversies with finality, and respond to the particular conditions in which law is applied in a manner that masks or softens its coercive

force. 143
People might favor institutions that manifest these virtues if they are
uncertain of which institutional arrangement is best suited to advance justice. Virtue, in this sense, is a consolation prize. This would suggest that
while claims of institutional virtue gain significance because they respond
to problems that follow from ongoing disagreements about justice, they
would justify a narrower range of authority than structural claims that tie
judicial authority to judges' advancing a contested view of justice. Indeed,
many claims of institutional virtue seem to be derived from litigant-centered claims, claims that do not even address the question of judicial authority to define values prospectively.
But debates in constitutional theory continue to focus on the justification of such prospective authority.144 In this context, claims of institutional
virtue often claim more authority for judges than is warranted by the justifications they offer. 14 5 For example, in arguing that judges should have
final authority to resolve disagreements about the Constitution, Alexander
and Schauer fail to consider the likelihood that judges would perform the
settlement function that is the basis of their claim within an institutional
arrangement that is not characterized by judicial supremacy.' 46
Moreover, the need to justify a more ambitious conception of judicial
authority would explain why some theorists combine structural claims defending greater judicial authority with supplementary claims of institutional
virtue. But they do so without considering the tension between the claims
and the possibility that judicial authority to advance justice makes it less
likely that the judicial process will manifest other virtues that they have
associated with it. Dworkin, for example, discounts the burdens on litigants who must live with an unsettled law when judges have authority to
make law reflect a coherent view of justice.14 7 And Devins and Fisher do
not consider the potential for instability that follows when judges have authority to vindicate interests that they believe essential to a discussion of
what the Constitution means.148
143. See, e.g., CARRESE, supra note 141, at 259-63; MACEDO, supra note 43; Alexander & Schauer,
supra note 3; Eylon & Harel, supra note 87; Gaus, supra note 64; Scalia, supra note 5.
144. See, e.g., CARRESE, supra note 141, at 259-63; MACEDO, supra note 64; Alexander & Schauer,
supra note 3; Eylon & Harel, supra note 87; Gaus, supra note 64; Scalia, supra note 5.
145. See, e.g., CARRESE, supra note 141, at 259-63; MACEDO, supra note 64; Alexander & Schauer,
supra note 3; Eylon & Harel, supra note 87; Gaus, supra note 64; Scalia, supra note 5.
146. See, e.g., CARRESE, supra note 141, at 259-63; MACEDO, supra note 64; Alexander & Schauer,
supra note 3; Eylon & Harel, supra note 87; Gaus, supra note 64; Scalia, supra note 5. It is not clear, for
example, why judges would not perform this function in a system in which legislators could overturn
judicial holdings as they apply to future cases. People would continue to know what the law is, when to
be alert to the possibility of doctrinal change, and where to look to determine whether change has
occurred. And judges will be in a position to shape the broader discussion of unsettled doctrinal questions, because legislators would have to decide the issues framed by the judiciary.
147. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 4, at 17.
148. See DEVINS
FISHER, supra note 3. In these examples, a claim of institutional virtue is
subordinated in favor of a structural claim. Graber's analysis suggests that one institutional virtue can
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This is indicative of a broader problem. Many claims of institutional
virtue speak to the problems of particular people who experience law, litigants in actual cases and potential litigants in future cases.' 4 9 And it is not
a coincidence that these claims find virtue in the Judiciary, an institution
which traditionally has mediated between generally applicable legal principles and the particular contexts in which they are enforced. There is a
problem, however, if broadening the scope of judicial authority would
make it so that judges are more likely to favor the general over the particular. One would expect that judges who view themselves in a long-term
fight to advance justice will be less sensitive to the interests of those most
immediately affected by litigation. In other words, reducing the Judiciary's
role in the process that defines constitutional values might create conditions in which the judicial process would manifest the virtues that many
believe justify judicial authority. And the argument to do so becomes more
compelling the greater the uncertainty about the correlation between judicial authority and justice.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This is only a sketch of an argument, one intended to illustrate that
claims of institutional virtue have significance for constitutional theory's
discussion of judicial authority. The question of whether claims of institutional virtue support reforms to reduce the scope of judicial authority is
best left for another essay. Moreover, it would be premature to answer
that question until one has a better sense of how claims of institutional
virtue fit within a broader discussion of judicial authority. Theorists who
assert claims of institutional virtue face at least three challenges.
The first is political: it is not clear that claims of institutional virtue
should lead people to support institutional reforms, even if people are uncertain about whether one institutional arrangement is more likely to advance justice than another. Someone might favor an institutional
arrangement that is less "virtuous" in order to support a status quo they
believe just. A person who believes that a woman's right to choose is integral to justice, for example, is not likely to favor institutional reforms that
be subordinated in favor of another. The centrism that Graber believes characterizes American judicial
politics might promote stability in two different ways. People might find virtue in a centrist judiciary
resolving ambiguities related to questions that have already been settled, such as the Taney Court's
attempt to enforce the Constitution's settlement of the slavery issue. The Court's centrism also would
provide reason to favor judicial resolution of controversies related to questions that are unsettled, as
seemed to be the case in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). It is not clear, however, that judges should
have the same authority to perform each of these functions. People might want judicial decisions to
carry greater weight when those decisions enforce prior political settlements, even if there are political
forces that challenge those settlements. But people might not want to give the same authority to judicial decisions that purport to settle controversies that have yet to be settled. Indeed, I have contended
that such an institutional arrangement might be a source of instability when issues are unusually volatile
and people believe that the decisions that resolve those issues enjoy too great a presumption of
authority.
149. See, e g., CARRESE, supra note 141, at 259-63; MACEDo, supra note 64; Alexander & Schauer,
supra note 3; Eylon & Harel, supra note 87; Gaus, supra note 64; Scalia, supra note 5.
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weaken the Judiciary, even if they knew that those reforms would yield an
institutional arrangement that would manifest important virtues.
This problem, however, does not go to the question of whether claims
of institutional virtue can justify a conception of judicial authority. It suggests a problem of politics, how to secure needed reforms in conditions in
which people resist them in the name of a short-term interest in justice. It
also suggests problems of political theory, whether people have reason to
favor an institutional arrangement that manifests important virtues over
one that advances justice in the short run or whether such an arrangement
should be imposed on people who resist it in the name of justice.
The second challenge is epistemological: it questions whether claims of
institutional virtue are any more certain than structural claims that associate particular institutional arrangements with just outcomes. But people
should be more confident about claims of institutional virtue. By their nature, these claims allow one to distinguish the effects of institutional arrangements from the effects of political forces that act on those
arrangements, because they depend on consequences of institutions that
have nothing to do with the disagreements of justice that people seek to
resolve. As a consequence, while political forces might attempt to direct
institutions to favorable decisions-whether measured by justice or other
interests-they do not act with the aim of making institutions manifest
their virtues.
Nonetheless, these forces might lead institutions to work in a manner
contrary to their design and thus prevent them from manifesting virtues.
Originalist judges might not be sufficiently constrained to promote rule of
law values, or political circumstances might make stability impossible, notwithstanding the centrism of a decision such as Dred Scott.150 But these
examples either reveal design flaws that explain why institutional arrangements fail to manifest the virtues that their proponents expect, or could be
counted anomalies if seen in relation to a record in which the institutions
act as predicted.
There is, however, another source of uncertainty, namely uncertainty
about the meaning of virtues associated with institutional arrangements.
People might disagree about what it means to represent people adequately
or about the conditions that would make one institutional arrangement
more stable than another. Disagreements of this kind are indicative of a
third challenge, one that is normative: people might disagree about the virtues that political institutions should manifest, just as they disagree about
the conceptions of justice that those institutions should advance.
These disagreements do not have the same consequences for politics
as do disagreements about justice. People do not contest disagreements
about the best institutional arrangement with the same vigor that they do
contests about justice, because the stakes are less. Indeed, most contests
150.

GRABER, supra note

6, at 38-39, 85-89.
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about institutional reform tend to involve structural claims acting as surrogates in a fight about what the Constitution means, rather than claims of
institutional virtue. One would not expect the debate about judicial
supremacy to have much salience, for example, if it were not associated
with Supreme Court decisions about abortion and civil rights.
This is not to say that disagreements about claims of institutional virtue are unimportant-only that many people treat them that way. What is
more, because the stakes of these disagreements are less, there is no political imperative to choose the most virtuous institutional arrangement the
way there is to choose an arrangement that will come closest to satisfying
particular conceptions of justice. And it seems possible that a plurality of
arrangements would bring virtue to the job of managing ongoing disagreements about what the Constitution means and, if so, the set of acceptable
alternatives would contain arrangements that offer different complements
of virtue. Choosing institutional arrangements, then, might be analogous
to choosing a car or other device in which the appropriate mix of qualities-such as reliability, performance, safety, and environmental friendliness-will depend on the particular buyer.
This suggests a different orientation for debates in constitutional theory. Rather than making arguments about the institutional arrangement
most likely to advance justice, theorists would frame choices about different institutional possibilities with an eye to ruling out options of insufficient
virtue. They would consider problems that institutions might address, how
well competing institutional arrangements would address those problems,
and the extent of authority necessary for those arrangements to be
effective.
The distinction between claims of institutional virtue and structural
claims points to such an orientation by questioning the perspective from
which constitutional theory has traditionally viewed questions of judicial
authority. It helps people to see that a discussion of the best institutional
arrangement for resolving disagreements about justice might not be relevant for a society that must manage ongoing contests about what the Constitution means, especially if those contests render uncertain arguments
that associate particular institutional arrangements with justice.
Moreover, claims of institutional virtue illuminate problems related to
the management of such contests and, in so doing, shine a critical light on
arguments that theorists make on behalf of institutions. This exposes
weaknesses of structural claims that associate expansive judicial authority
with contested assumptions about justice, vague claims that fail to clarify
the functions judges serve in constitutional politics and thus the authority
necessary to perform those functions, mixed claims that fail to resolve tensions among the different functions that judges are expected to perform,
and claims of institutional virtue that justify a broader scope of judicial
authority than is necessary to perform the functions that underlie their

justifications.

